Gecko [ www.utparral.edu.mx ]

Name	Size	Permission
snap-confine.snapd.25202	31.43 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap-confine.snapd.25577	31.43 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.firefox.firefox	123.81 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.firefox.geckodriver	124.65 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.firefox.hook.configure	43.01 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.firefox.hook.disconnect-plug-host-hunspell	30.97 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.firefox.hook.install	30.9 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.firefox.hook.post-refresh	31.11 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.snapd-desktop-integration.hook.configure	45.76 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.snapd-desktop-integration.snapd-desktop-integration	87.08 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.snap-store.hook.configure	49.33 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.snap-store.snap-store	88.36 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.snap-store.ubuntu-software	88.37 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.snap-store.ubuntu-software-local-file	88.41 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap-update-ns.firefox	107.06 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap-update-ns.snapd-desktop-integration	108.15 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap-update-ns.snap-store	102.72 KB	-rw-r--r--

Code Editor : snap.firefox.firefox

# vim:syntax=apparmor

#include <tunables/global>

#include if exists "/etc/apparmor.d/tunables/home.d"
#include if exists "/var/lib/snapd/apparmor/snap-tuning"

# snapd supports the concept of 'parallel installs' where snaps with the same
# name are differentiated by '_<instance>' such that foo, foo_bar and foo_baz
# may all be installed on the system. To support this, SNAP_NAME is set to the
# name (eg, 'foo') while SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME is set to the instance name (eg
# 'foo_bar'). The profile name and most rules therefore reference
# SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME. In some cases, snapd will adjust the snap's runtime
# environment so the snap doesn't have to be aware of the distinction (eg,
# SNAP, SNAP_DATA and SNAP_COMMON are all bind mounted onto a directory with
# SNAP_NAME so the security policy will allow writing to both locations (since
# they are equivalent).

# This is a snap name without the instance key
@{SNAP_NAME}="firefox"
# This is a snap name with instance key
@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}="firefox"
@{SNAP_INSTANCE_DESKTOP}="firefox"
@{SNAP_COMMAND_NAME}="firefox"
@{SNAP_REVISION}="7423"
@{PROFILE_DBUS}="snap_2efirefox_2efirefox"
@{INSTALL_DIR}="/{,var/lib/snapd/}snap"

profile "snap.firefox.firefox" flags=(attach_disconnected,mediate_deleted) {
  #include <abstractions/base>
  #include <abstractions/consoles>
  #include <abstractions/openssl>

# While in later versions of the base abstraction, include this explicitly
  # for series 16 and cross-distro
  /etc/ld.so.preload r,

# The base abstraction doesn't yet have this
  /etc/sysconfig/clock r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/maps k,

# /proc/XXXX/map_files contains the same info than /proc/XXXX/maps, but
  # in a format that is simpler to manage, because it doesn't require to
  # parse the text data inside a file, but just reading the contents of
  # a directory.
  # Reading /proc/XXXX/maps is already allowed in the base template
  # via <abstractions/base>. Also, only the owner can read it, and the
  # kernel limits access to it by requiring 'ptrace' enabled, so allowing
  # to access /proc/XXXX/map_files can be considered secure too.
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/map_files/ r,

# While the base abstraction has rules for encryptfs encrypted home and
  # private directories, it is missing rules for directory read on the toplevel
  # directory of the mount (LP: #1848919)
  owner @{HOME}/.Private/ r,
  owner @{HOMEDIRS}/.ecryptfs/*/.Private/ r,

# for python apps/services
  #include <abstractions/python>
  /etc/python3.[0-9]*/**                                r,

# explicitly deny noisy denials to read-only filesystems (see LP: #1496895
# for details)
deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/ w,
deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/**.pyc.[0-9]* w,
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**/__pycache__/             w,
deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**/__pycache__/*.pyc.[0-9]* w,

# for perl apps/services
  #include <abstractions/perl>
  # Missing from perl abstraction
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/auto/**.so* mr,

# Note: the following dangerous accesses should not be allowed in most
  # policy, but we cannot explicitly deny since other trusted interfaces might
  # add them.
  # Explicitly deny ptrace for now since it can be abused to break out of the
  # seccomp sandbox. https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/18/823
  #audit deny ptrace (trace),

# Explicitly deny capability mknod so apps can't create devices
  #audit deny capability mknod,

# Explicitly deny mount, remount and umount so apps can't modify things in
  # their namespace
  #audit deny mount,
  #audit deny remount,
  #audit deny umount,

# End dangerous accesses

# Note: this potentially allows snaps to DoS other snaps via resource
  # exhaustion but we can't sensibly mediate this today. In the future we may
  # employ cgroup limits, AppArmor rlimit mlock rules or something else.
  capability ipc_lock,

# for bash 'binaries' (do *not* use abstractions/bash)
  # user-specific bash files
  /etc/bash.bashrc r,
  /etc/inputrc r,
  /etc/environment r,
  /etc/profile r,

# user/group/seat lookups
  /etc/{passwd,group,nsswitch.conf} r,  # very common
  /var/lib/extrausers/{passwd,group} r,
  /run/systemd/users/[0-9]* r,
  /etc/default/nss r,

# libnss-systemd (subset from nameservice abstraction)
  #
  #   https://systemd.io/USER_GROUP_API/
  #   https://systemd.io/USER_RECORD/
  #   https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/nss-systemd.html
  #
  # Allow User/Group lookups via common VarLink socket APIs. Applications need
  # to either consult all of them or the io.systemd.Multiplexer frontend.
  /run/systemd/userdb/ r,
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Multiplexer rw,
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.DynamicUser rw,        # systemd-exec users
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Home rw,               # systemd-home dirs
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.NameServiceSwitch rw,  # UNIX/glibc NSS
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Machine rw,            # systemd-machined

/etc/libnl-3/{classid,pktloc} r,      # apps that use libnl

# For snappy reexec on 4.8+ kernels
  /usr/lib/snapd/snap-exec m,

# For gdb support
  /usr/lib/snapd/snap-gdb-shim ixr,
  /usr/lib/snapd/snap-gdbserver-shim ixr,

# For in-snap tab completion
  /etc/bash_completion.d/{,*} r,
  /usr/lib/snapd/etelpmoc.sh ixr,               # marshaller (see complete.sh for out-of-snap unmarshal)
  /usr/share/bash-completion/bash_completion r, # user-provided completions (run in-snap) may use functions from here

# uptime
  @{PROC}/uptime r,
  @{PROC}/loadavg r,

# Allow reading /etc/os-release. On Ubuntu 16.04+ it is a symlink to /usr/lib
  # which is allowed by the base abstraction, but on 14.04 it is an actual file
  # so need to add it here. Also allow read locks on the file.
  /etc/os-release rk,
  /usr/lib/os-release k,

# Debian version of the host OS which might be required in AppArmor-secured Debian
  /etc/debian_version r,

# systemd native journal API (see sd_journal_print(4)). This should be in
  # AppArmor's base abstraction, but until it is, include here. We include
  # the base journal path as well as the journal namespace pattern path. Each
  # journal namespace for quota groups will be prefixed with 'snap-'.
  /run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/socket w,
  /run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/stdout rw, # 'r' shouldn't be needed, but journald
                                            # doesn't leak anything so allow
  /run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/dev-log w,

# snapctl and its requirements
  /usr/bin/snapctl ixr,
  /usr/lib/snapd/snapctl ixr,
  @{PROC}/sys/net/core/somaxconn r,
  /run/snapd-snap.socket rw,

# Note: for now, don't explicitly deny this noisy denial so --devmode isn't
  # broken but eventually we may conditionally deny this since it is an
  # information leak.
  #deny /{,var/}run/utmp r,

# Allow reading the maximum number of open file descriptors.
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/nr_open r,

# java
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/ r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/fd/ r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/auxv r,
  @{PROC}/sys/vm/zone_reclaim_mode r,
  /etc/lsb-release r,
  /sys/devices/**/read_ahead_kb r,
  /sys/devices/system/cpu/** r,
  /sys/devices/system/node/node[0-9]*/* r,
  /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled r,
  /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/defrag r,
  # NOTE: this leaks running process but java seems to want it (even though it
  # seems to operate ok without it) and SDL apps crash without it. Allow owner
  # match until AppArmor kernel var is available to solve this properly (see
  # LP: #1546825 for details). comm is a subset of cmdline, so allow it too.
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/cmdline r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/comm r,

# Per man(5) proc, the kernel enforces that a thread may only modify its comm
  # value or those in its thread group.
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/@{tid}/comm rw,

# Allow reading and writing to our file descriptors in /proc which, for
  # example, allow access to /dev/std{in,out,err} which are all symlinks to
  # /proc/self/fd/{0,1,2} respectively. To support the open(..., O_TMPFILE)
  # linkat() temporary file technique, allow all fds. Importantly, access to
  # another task's fd via this proc interface is mediated via 'ptrace (read)'
  # (readonly) and 'ptrace (trace)' (read/write) which is denied by default, so
  # this rule by itself doesn't allow opening another snap's fds via proc.
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/{,task/@{tid}}fd/[0-9]* rw,

# Miscellaneous accesses
  /dev/{,u}random w,
  /etc/machine-id r,
  /etc/mime.types r,
  /etc/default/keyboard r,
  @{PROC}/ r,
  @{PROC}/version r,
  @{PROC}/version_signature r,
  /etc/{,writable/}hostname r,
  /etc/{,writable/}localtime r,
  /etc/{,writable/}mailname r,
  /etc/{,writable/}timezone r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/cgroup rk,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/cpuset r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/io r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/fdinfo/* r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/limits r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/loginuid r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/sessionid r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/smaps r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/stat r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/statm r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/status r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/ r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/smaps r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/stat r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/statm r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/status r,
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/pipe-max-size r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/hostname r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/osrelease r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/ostype r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/pid_max r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/shmmax r,
  # Allow apps to introspect the level of dbus mediation AppArmor implements.
  /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features/dbus/mask r,
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/file-max r,
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/file-nr r,
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/inotify/max_* r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/pid_max r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/boot_id r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/uuid r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap r,
  # Allow access to the uuidd daemon (this daemon is a thin wrapper around
  # time and getrandom()/{,u}random and, when available, runs under an
  # unprivilged, dedicated user).
  /run/uuidd/request rw,
  /sys/devices/virtual/tty/{console,tty*}/active r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,user.slice/}memory.limit_in_bytes r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.limit_in_bytes r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.stat r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.max r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,user.slice/}cpu.cfs_{period,quota}_us r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/cpu.cfs_{period,quota}_us r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,user.slice/}cpu.shares r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/cpu.shares r,
  /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/hpage_pmd_size r,
  /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled r,
  /{,usr/}lib/ r,

# Reads of oom_adj and oom_score_adj are safe
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/oom_{,score_}adj r,

# Note: for now, don't explicitly deny write access so --devmode isn't broken
  # but eventually we may conditionally deny this since it allows the process
  # to increase the oom heuristic of other processes (make them more likely to
  # be killed). Once AppArmor kernel var is available to solve this properly,
  # this can safely be allowed since non-root processes won't be able to
  # decrease the value and root processes will only be able to with
  # 'capability sys_resource,' which we deny be default.
  # deny owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/oom_{,score_}adj w,

# Eases hardware assignment (doesn't give anything away)
  /etc/udev/udev.conf r,
  /sys/       r,
  /sys/bus/   r,
  /sys/class/ r,

# this leaks interface names and stats, but not in a way that is traceable
  # to the user/device
  @{PROC}/net/dev r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/net/dev r,

# Read-only of this snap
  /var/lib/snapd/snaps/@{SNAP_NAME}_*.snap r,

# Read-only of snapd restart state for snapctl specifically
  /var/lib/snapd/maintenance.json r,

# Read-only for the install directory
  # bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/                   r,
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}}/    r,
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}}/**  mrklix,

# Read-only install directory for other revisions to help with bugs like
  # LP: #1616650 and LP: #1655992
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**  mrkix,

# Read-only home area for other versions
  # bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/                  r,
  owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/**                mrkix,

# Experimental snap folder changes
  owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/                    r,
  owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/**                  mrkix,
  owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
  owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/common/**           wl,

owner @{HOME}/Snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/                          r,
  owner @{HOME}/Snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/**                        mrkixwl,

# Writable home area for this version.
  # bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
  owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/common/** wl,

# Read-only system area for other versions
  # bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  /var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/   r,
  /var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/** mrkix,

# Writable system area only for this version
  # bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  /var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
  /var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/common/** wl,

# The snap-confine program creates an app-specific private restricted /tmp
  # and will fail to launch the app if something goes wrong. As such, we can
  # simply allow full access to /tmp.
  /tmp/   r,
  /tmp/** mrwlkix,

# App-specific access to files and directories in /dev/shm. We allow file
  # access in /dev/shm for shm_open() and files in subdirectories for open()
  # bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  /{dev,run}/shm/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.** mrwlkix,
  # Also allow app-specific access for sem_open()
  /{dev,run}/shm/sem.snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.* mrwlk,

# Snap-specific XDG_RUNTIME_DIR that is based on the UID of the user
  # bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  owner /run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/   rw,
  owner /run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,

# Allow apps from the same package to communicate with each other via an
  # abstract or anonymous socket
  unix (bind, listen) addr="@snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.**",
  unix peer=(label=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*),

# Allow apps from the same package to communicate with each other via DBus.
  # Note: this does not grant access to the DBus sockets of well known buses
  # (will still need to use an appropriate interface for that).
  dbus (receive, send) peer=(label=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*),
  # In addition to the above, dbus-run-session attempts reading these files
  # from the snap base runtime.
  /usr/share/dbus-1/services/{,*} r,
  /usr/share/dbus-1/system-services/{,*} r,
  # Allow apps to perform DBus introspection on org.freedesktop.DBus for both
  # the system and session buses.
  # Note: this does not grant access to the DBus sockets of these buses, but
  # we grant it here since it is missing from the dbus abstractions
  # (LP: #1866168)
  dbus (send)
      bus={session,system}
      path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
      interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
      member=Introspect
      peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow apps from the same package to signal each other via signals
  signal peer=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*,

# Allow receiving signals from all snaps (and focus on mediating sending of
  # signals)
  signal (receive) peer=snap.*,

# Allow receiving signals from unconfined (eg, systemd)
  signal (receive) peer=unconfined,

# for 'udevadm trigger --verbose --dry-run --tag-match=snappy-assign'
  /{,usr/}{,s}bin/udevadm ixr,
  /etc/udev/udev.conf r,
  /{,var/}run/udev/tags/snappy-assign/ r,
  @{PROC}/cmdline r,
  /sys/devices/**/uevent r,

# LP: #1447237: adding '--property-match=SNAPPY_APP=<pkgname>' to the above
  # requires:
  #   /run/udev/data/* r,
  # but that reveals too much about the system and cannot be granted to apps
  # by default at this time.

# For convenience, allow apps to see what is in /dev even though cgroups
  # will block most access
  /dev/ r,
  /dev/**/ r,

# Allow setting up pseudoterminal via /dev/pts system. This is safe because
  # the launcher uses a per-app devpts newinstance.
  /dev/ptmx rw,

# Do the same with /sys/devices and /sys/class to help people using hw-assign
  /sys/devices/ r,
  /sys/devices/**/ r,
  /sys/class/ r,
  /sys/class/**/ r,

# Allow all snaps to chroot
  capability sys_chroot,

# Lttng tracing is very noisy and should not be allowed by confined apps. Can
  # safely deny for the normal case (LP: #1260491). If/when an lttng-trace
  # interface is needed, we can rework this.
  deny /{dev,run,var/run}/shm/lttng-ust-* rw,

# Allow read-access on /home/ for navigating to other parts of the
  # filesystem. While this allows enumerating users, this is already allowed
  # via /etc/passwd and getent.
  @{HOMEDIRS}/ r,

# Allow read-access to / for navigating to other parts of the filesystem.
  / r,

# Snap-specific run directory. Bind mount *not* used here
  # (see 'parallel installs', above)
  /run/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
  /run/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,

# Snap-specific lock directory and prerequisite navigation permissions.
  /run/lock/ r,
  /run/lock/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
  /run/lock/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,

# Allow listing and reading systemd-provided credentials.
  /run/credentials/ r,
  /run/credentials/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*.service/ r,
  /run/credentials/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*.service/** r,

# Default rules for core base runtimes

# The base abstraction doesn't yet have this
  /{,usr/}lib/terminfo/** rk,
  /usr/share/terminfo/** k,
  /usr/share/zoneinfo/** k,

# for python apps/services
  /usr/bin/python{,2,2.[0-9]*,3,3.[0-9]*} ixr,
  # additional accesses needed for newer pythons in later bases
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/**.{pyc,so}           mr,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/**.{egg,py,pth}       r,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/{site,dist}-packages/ r,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/lib-dynload/*.so      mr,
  /usr/include/python3.[0-9]*/pyconfig.h               r,

# for perl apps/services
  /usr/bin/perl{,5*} ixr,
  # AppArmor <2.12 doesn't have rules for perl-base, so add them here
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/**            r,
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/[0-9]*/**.so* mr,

# for bash 'binaries' (do *not* use abstractions/bash)
  # user-specific bash files
  /{,usr/}bin/bash ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dash ixr,
  /usr/share/terminfo/** r,

# Common utilities for shell scripts
  /{,usr/}bin/arch ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/{,g,m}awk ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/base32 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/base64 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/basename ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bunzip2 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/busctl ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzcat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzdiff ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzgrep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzip2 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/chgrp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/chmod ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/chown ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/clear ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cmp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cpio ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cut ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/date ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dbus-daemon ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dbus-run-session ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dbus-send ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dd ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/diff{,3} ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dirname ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/du ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/echo ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/{,e,f,r}grep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/env ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/expr ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/false ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/find ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/flock ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/fmt ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/fold ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/getconf ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/getent ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/getopt ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/groups ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/gzip ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/head ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/hostname ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/id ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/igawk ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/infocmp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/kill ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ldd ixr,
  /{usr/,}lib{,32,64}/ld{,32,64}-*.so ix,
  /{usr/,}lib/@{multiarch}/ld{,32,64}-*.so* ix,
  /{,usr/}bin/less{,file,pipe} ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ln ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/line ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/link ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/locale ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/logger ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ls ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/md5sum ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mkdir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mkfifo ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mknod ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mktemp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/more ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mv ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/nice ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/nohup ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/numfmt ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/od ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/openssl ixr, # may cause harmless capability block_suspend denial
  /{,usr/}bin/paste ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/pgrep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/printenv ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/printf ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ps ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/pwd ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/readlink ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/realpath ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/rev ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/rm ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/rmdir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/run-parts ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sed ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/seq ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/setpriv ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sha{1,224,256,384,512}sum ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/shuf ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sleep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sort ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/stat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/stdbuf ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/stty ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sync ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/systemd-cat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/systemd-creds ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tac ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tail ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tar ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tee ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/test ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tempfile ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tset ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/touch ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tput ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tr ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/true ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tty ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/uname ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/uniq ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/unlink ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/unxz ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/unzip ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/uptime ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/vdir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/vim.tiny ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/wc ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/which{,.debianutils} ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/xargs ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/xz ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/yes ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/zcat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/z{,e,f}grep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/zip ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/zipgrep ixr,

# lsb-release
  /usr/bin/lsb_release ixr,
  /usr/bin/ r,
  /usr/share/distro-info/*.csv r,

# For printing the cache (we don't allow updating the cache)
  /{,usr/}sbin/ldconfig{,.real} ixr,

# Allow all snaps to chroot
  /{,usr/}sbin/chroot ixr,

# Rules added by the mount-control interface
  capability sys_admin,  # for mount

owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/mounts r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/mountinfo r,
  owner @{PROC}/self/mountinfo r,

/{,usr/}bin/mount ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/umount ixr,
  # mount/umount (via libmount) track some mount info in these files
  /run/mount/utab* wrlk,
  mount  options=(ro,bind,noatime,noexec) "/usr/share/hunspell" -> "/var/snap/firefox/common/host-hunspell{,/}",
  umount "/var/snap/firefox/common/host-hunspell{,/}",

# Access for communication with audio recording service done via
# audio-playback interface. The audio service will verify if the audio-record
# interface is connected.

# Allow access to the Wayland compositor server socket
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/wayland-[0-9]* rw,

# Needed when using QT_QPA_PLATFORM=wayland-egl (MESA dri config)
/etc/drirc r,

# Allow communicating with pulseaudio service
/{run,dev}/shm/pulse-shm-* mrwk,

owner /{,var/}run/pulse/ r,
owner /{,var/}run/pulse/native rwk,
owner /{,var/}run/pulse/pid r,
owner /{,var/}run/user/[0-9]*/ r,
owner /{,var/}run/user/[0-9]*/pulse/ r,

/run/udev/data/c116:[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/+sound:card[0-9]* r,

# Allow communicating with pulseaudio service on the desktop in classic distro.
# Only on desktop do we need access to /etc/pulse for any PulseAudio client
# to read available client side configuration settings. On an Ubuntu Core
# device those things will be stored inside the snap directory.
/etc/pulse/ r,
/etc/pulse/** r,
owner @{HOME}/.pulse-cookie rk,
owner @{HOME}/.config/pulse/cookie rk,
owner /{,var/}run/user/*/pulse/ r,
owner /{,var/}run/user/*/pulse/native rwk,
owner /{,var/}run/user/*/pulse/pid r,

# Allow communicating with the cups server for printing and configuration.

#include <abstractions/cups-client>
/{,var/}run/cups/printcap r,

# Allow receiving all DBus signal notifications from the daemon (see
# notifier/dbus.c in cups sources)
dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    path=/org/cups/cupsd/Notifier
    interface=org.cups.cupsd.Notifier
    peer=(label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/cupsd,cupsd}"),

# Allow reading login and session information
/{,usr/}bin/who  ixr,
/var/log/wtmp    rk,
/{,var/}run/utmp rk,

/{,usr/}bin/lastlog ixr,
/var/log/lastlog rk,

/{,usr/}bin/faillog ixr,
/var/log/faillog rk,

# systemd session information (session files, but not .ref files)
/run/systemd/sessions/ r,
/run/systemd/sessions/*[0-9] rk,

# Supported loginctl commands:
# - list-sessions
# - show-session N
# - list-users
# - show-user N
# - list-seats
# - show-seat N

/{,usr/}bin/loginctl ixr,
#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>

# Introspection of org.freedesktop.login1
# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/login1{,/seat/*,/session/*,/user/*}
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect,

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/login1{,/seat/*,/session/*,/user/*}
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get{,All},

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/login1
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=PropertiesChanged
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/login1
    interface=org.freedesktop.login1.Manager
    member={Session,User,Seat}New
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/login1
    interface=org.freedesktop.login1.Manager
    member={Session,User,Seat}Removed
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/login1
    interface=org.freedesktop.login1.Manager
    member=PrepareFor{Shutdow,Sleep}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/login1
    interface=org.freedesktop.login1.Manager
    member=List{Seats,Sessions,Users},

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/login1
    interface=org.freedesktop.login1.Manager
    member=Get{Seat,Session,User},

# Allow unconfined clients to interact with the player on classic
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/org/mpris/MediaPlayer2
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

# Description: Allow operating as an MPRIS player.

# DBus accesses
#include <abstractions/dbus-session-strict>

# https://specifications.freedesktop.org/mpris-spec/latest/
# allow binding to the well-known DBus mpris interface based on the snap's name
dbus (bind)
    bus=session
    name="org.mpris.MediaPlayer2.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}",

# register as a player
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member="{Request,Release}Name"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member="GetConnectionUnix{ProcessID,User}"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/mpris/MediaPlayer2
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member="{GetAll,PropertiesChanged}"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/mpris/MediaPlayer2
    interface="org.mpris.MediaPlayer2{,.Player}"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

# we can always connect to ourselves
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/org/mpris/MediaPlayer2
    peer=(label=@{profile_name}),

# Description: Allow owning a name on DBus public bus

#include <abstractions/dbus-session-strict>

# register on DBus
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member="{Request,Release}Name"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member="GetConnectionUnix{ProcessID,User}"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member="GetConnectionCredentials"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

# bind to a well-known DBus name: org.mozilla.firefox
dbus (bind)
    bus=session
    name=org.mozilla.firefox,

# For KDE applications and some other cases, also support alternation for:
# - using org.kde.foo-PID as the 'well-known' name
# - using org.foo.cmd_<num>_<num> as the 'well-known' name
# Note, snapd does not allow declaring a 'well-known' name that ends with
# '-[0-9]+' or that contains '_'. Parallel installs of DBus services aren't
# supported at this time, but if they were, this could allow a parallel
# install'swell-known name to overlap with the normal install.
dbus (bind)
    bus=session
    name=org.mozilla.firefox{_,-}[1-9]{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9]}{,_[1-9]{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9_]}{,[0-9]}},

# For Firefox, support using org.mozilla.firefox.<id> as the 'well-known' name
# where <id> is the base64-encoded profile name.
# See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1441894 for a discussion and details.
dbus (bind)
    bus=session
    name="org.mozilla.firefox.*",

# Allow us to talk to dbus-daemon
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path="/org/mozilla/firefox{,/**}"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path="/org/mozilla/firefox{,/**}"
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

# Allow us to introspect org.freedesktop.DBus (needed by pydbus)
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

# Description: Allow reading and writing to joystick devices

#
# Old joystick interface
#

# Per https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt
# only js0-js31 is valid so limit the /dev and udev entries to those devices.
/dev/input/js{[0-9],[12][0-9],3[01]} rw,
/run/udev/data/c13:{[0-9],[12][0-9],3[01]} r,

#
# New evdev-joystick interface
#

# Per https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt
# the minor is 65 and up so limit udev to that.
/run/udev/data/c13:{6[5-9],[7-9][0-9],[1-9][0-9][0-9]*} r,

# /dev/input/event* is unfortunately not namespaced and includes all input
# devices, including keyboards and mice, which allows input sniffing and
# injection. Until we have inode tagging of devices, we use a glob rule here
# and rely on udev tagging to only add evdev devices to the snap's device
# cgroup that are marked with ENV{ID_INPUT_JOYSTICK}=="1". As such, even though
# AppArmor allows all evdev, the device cgroup does not.
/dev/input/event[0-9]* rw,

# Allow reading for supported event reports for all input devices. See
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/input/event-codes.txt
# FIXME: this is a very minor information leak and snapd should instead query
# udev for the specific accesses associated with the above devices.
/sys/devices/**/input[0-9]*/capabilities/* r,

# Description: Allow write access to u2f hidraw devices.

# Use a glob rule and rely on device cgroup for mediation.
/dev/hidraw* rw,

# char 234-254 are used for dynamic assignment, which u2f devices are
/run/udev/data/c23[4-9]:* r,
/run/udev/data/c24[0-9]:* r,
/run/udev/data/c25[0-4]:* r,

# misc required accesses
/run/udev/data/+power_supply:hid* r,
/run/udev/data/c14:[0-9]* r,
/sys/devices/**/i2c*/**/report_descriptor r,
/sys/devices/**/usb*/**/report_descriptor r,

# Description: Can access Unity7. Note, Unity 7 runs on X and requires access
# to various DBus services and this environment does not prevent eavesdropping
# or apps interfering with one another.

#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
#include <abstractions/dbus-session-strict>

# Allow finding the DBus session bus id (eg, via dbus_bus_get_id())
dbus (send)
     bus=session
     path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
     interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
     member=GetId
     peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

#include <abstractions/X>

#include <abstractions/fonts>
owner @{HOME}/.local/share/fonts/{,**} r,
/var/cache/fontconfig/   r,
/var/cache/fontconfig/** mr,

# subset of gnome abstraction
/etc/gnome/defaults.list r,

/etc/gtk-*/*                               r,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/gtk-*/**                  mr,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/gdk-pixbuf-*/**           mr,
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gtk-*/**             mr,
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gdk-pixbuf-*/**      mr,

/etc/pango/*                               r,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/pango/**                  mr,
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/pango/**             mr,

/usr/share/icons/                          r,
/usr/share/icons/**                        r,
/usr/share/icons/*/index.theme             rk,
/usr/share/pixmaps/                        r,
/usr/share/pixmaps/**                      r,

# The snapcraft desktop part may look for schema files in various locations, so
# allow reading system installed schemas.
/usr/share/glib*/schemas/{,*}              r,

# Snappy's 'xdg-open' talks to the snapd-xdg-open service which currently works
# only in environments supporting dbus-send (eg, X11). In the future once
# snappy's xdg-open supports all snaps images, this access may move to another
# interface. This is duplicated from desktop for compatibility with existing
# snaps.
/usr/bin/xdg-open ixr,
# While /usr/share/applications comes from the base runtime of the snap, it
# has some things that snaps actually need, so allow access to those and deny
# access to the others. This is duplicated from desktop for compatibility with
# existing snaps.
/usr/share/applications/ r,
/usr/share/applications/mimeapps.list r,
/usr/share/applications/xdg-open.desktop r,
# silence noisy denials from desktop files in core* snaps that aren't usable by
# snaps
deny /usr/share/applications/python*.desktop r,
deny /usr/share/applications/vim.desktop r,
deny /usr/share/applications/snap-handle-link.desktop r,  # core16

# This allow access to the first version of the snapd-xdg-open
# version which was shipped outside of snapd
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/
    interface=com.canonical.SafeLauncher
    member=OpenURL
    peer=(label=unconfined),
# ... and this allows access to the new xdg-open service which
# is now part of snapd itself.
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/io/snapcraft/Launcher
    interface=io.snapcraft.Launcher
    member={OpenURL,OpenFile}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow use of snapd's internal 'xdg-settings'
/usr/bin/xdg-settings ixr,
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/io/snapcraft/Settings
    interface=io.snapcraft.Settings
    member={Check,CheckSub,Get,GetSub,Set,SetSub}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# input methods (ibus)
# subset of ibus abstraction
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gtk-2.0/[0-9]*/immodules/im-ibus.so mr,
owner @{HOME}/.config/ibus/      r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/ibus/bus/  r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/ibus/bus/* r,

# allow communicating with ibus-daemon (this allows sniffing key events)
unix (connect, receive, send)
     type=stream
     peer=(addr="@/tmp/ibus/dbus-*"),

# abstract path in ibus >= 1.5.22 uses $XDG_CACHE_HOME (ie, @{HOME}/.cache)
# This should use this, but due to LP: #1856738 we cannot
#unix (connect, receive, send)
#    type=stream
#    peer=(addr="@@{HOME}/.cache/ibus/dbus-*"),
unix (connect, receive, send)
     type=stream
     peer=(addr="@/home/*/.cache/ibus/dbus-*"),

# input methods (mozc)
# allow communicating with mozc server (TODO: investigate if allows sniffing)
unix (connect, receive, send)
     type=stream
     peer=(addr="@tmp/.mozc.*"),

# input methods (fcitx)
# allow communicating with fcitx dbus service
dbus send
    bus=fcitx
    path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member={Hello,AddMatch,RemoveMatch,GetNameOwner,NameHasOwner,StartServiceByName}
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus),

owner @{HOME}/.config/fcitx/dbus/* r,

# allow creating an input context
dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputmethod
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputMethod
    member=CreateIC*
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# allow setting up and tearing down the input context
dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputcontext_[0-9]*
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext
    member="{Close,Destroy,Enable}IC"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputcontext_[0-9]*
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext
    member=Reset
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# allow service to send us signals
dbus receive
    bus=fcitx
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus receive
    bus=session
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.*
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# use the input context
dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputcontext_[0-9]*
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext
    member="Focus{In,Out}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputcontext_[0-9]*
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext
    member="{CommitPreedit,Set*}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# this is an information leak and allows key and mouse sniffing. If the input
# context path were tied to the process' security label, this would not be an
# issue.
dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputcontext_[0-9]*
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext
    member="{MouseEvent,ProcessKeyEvent}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# this method does not exist with the sunpinyin backend (at least), so allow
# it for other input methods. This may consitute an information leak (which,
# again, could be avoided if the path were tied to the process' security
# label).
dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputcontext_[0-9]*
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=GetAll
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Needed by QtSystems on X to detect mouse and keyboard. Note, the 'netlink
# raw' rule is not finely mediated by apparmor so we mediate with seccomp arg
# filtering.
network netlink raw,
/run/udev/data/c13:[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/+input:* r,

# subset of freedesktop.org
/usr/share/mime/**                   r,
owner @{HOME}/.local/share/mime/**   r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/user-dirs.* r,

/etc/xdg/user-dirs.conf r,
/etc/xdg/user-dirs.defaults r,

# gtk settings (subset of gnome abstraction)
owner @{HOME}/.config/gtk-2.0/gtkfilechooser.ini r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/gtk-3.0/settings.ini r,
# Note: this leaks directory names that wouldn't otherwise be known to the snap
owner @{HOME}/.config/gtk-3.0/bookmarks r,

# accessibility
#include <abstractions/dbus-accessibility-strict>
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/a11y/bus
    interface=org.a11y.Bus
    member=GetAddress
    peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/a11y/bus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get{,All}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# unfortunate, but org.a11y.atspi is not designed for separation
dbus (receive, send)
    bus=accessibility
    path=/org/a11y/atspi/**
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# org.freedesktop.Accounts
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/Accounts
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/Accounts
    interface=org.freedesktop.Accounts
    member=FindUserById
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Get() is an information leak
# TODO: verify what it is leaking
dbus (receive, send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/Accounts/User[0-9]*
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member={Get,PropertiesChanged}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# gmenu
# Note: the gmenu DBus api was not designed for application isolation and apps
# may specify anything as their 'path'. For example, these work in the many
# cases:
# - /org/gtk/Application/anonymous{,/**}
# - /com/canonical/unity/gtk/window/[0-9]*
# but libreoffice does:
# - /org/libreoffice{,/**}
# As such, cannot mediate by DBus path so we'll be as strict as we can in the
# other mediated parts
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.gtk.Actions
    member=Changed
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=org.gtk.Actions
    member={Activate,DescribeAll,SetState}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=org.gtk.Menus
    member={Start,End}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.gtk.Menus
    member=Changed
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Ubuntu menus
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path="/com/ubuntu/MenuRegistrar"
    interface="com.ubuntu.MenuRegistrar"
    member="{Register,Unregister}{App,Surface}Menu"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# url helper
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=com.canonical.SafeLauncher.OpenURL
    peer=(label=unconfined),
# new url helper (part of snap userd)
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=io.snapcraft.Launcher.OpenURL
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# dbusmenu
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/{MenuBar{,/[0-9A-F]*},com/canonical/{menu/[0-9A-F]*,dbusmenu}}
    interface=com.canonical.dbusmenu
    member="{LayoutUpdated,ItemsPropertiesUpdated}"
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/{MenuBar{,/[0-9A-F]*},com/canonical/{menu/[0-9A-F]*,dbusmenu}}
    interface="{com.canonical.dbusmenu,org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties}"
    member=Get*
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/{MenuBar{,/[0-9A-F]*},com/canonical/{menu/[0-9A-F]*,dbusmenu}}
    interface=com.canonical.dbusmenu
    member="{AboutTo*,Event*}"
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/{MenuBar{,/[0-9A-F]*},com/canonical/{menu/[0-9A-F]*,dbusmenu}}
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/com/canonical/dbusmenu
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get*
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

# app-indicators
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/StatusNotifierWatcher
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect
    peer=(name=org.kde.StatusNotifierWatcher, label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member="{GetConnectionUnixProcessID,RequestName,ReleaseName}"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

dbus (bind)
    bus=session
    name=org.kde.StatusNotifierItem-[0-9]*,

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/StatusNotifierWatcher
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get
    peer=(name=org.kde.StatusNotifierWatcher, label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/{StatusNotifierWatcher,org/ayatana/NotificationItem/*}
    interface=org.kde.StatusNotifierWatcher
    member=RegisterStatusNotifierItem
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/{StatusNotifierItem,org/ayatana/NotificationItem/*}
    interface=org.kde.StatusNotifierItem
    member="New{AttentionIcon,Icon,IconThemePath,OverlayIcon,Status,Title,ToolTip}"
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/{StatusNotifierItem,org/ayatana/NotificationItem/*}
    interface=org.kde.StatusNotifierItem
    member={Activate,ContextMenu,Scroll,SecondaryActivate,ProvideXdgActivationToken,XAyatanaSecondaryActivate}
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/{StatusNotifierItem/menu,org/ayatana/NotificationItem/*/Menu}
    interface=com.canonical.dbusmenu
    member="{LayoutUpdated,ItemsPropertiesUpdated}"
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/{StatusNotifierItem,StatusNotifierItem/menu,org/ayatana/NotificationItem/**}
    interface={org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties,com.canonical.dbusmenu}
    member={Get*,AboutTo*,Event*}
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

# notifications
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
    interface=org.freedesktop.Notifications
    member="{GetCapabilities,GetServerInformation,Notify,CloseNotification}"
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
    interface=org.freedesktop.Notifications
    member={ActionInvoked,NotificationClosed,NotificationReplied}
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

# KDE Plasma's Inhibited property indicating "do not disturb" mode
# https://invent.kde.org/plasma/plasma-workspace/-/blob/master/libnotificationmanager/dbus/org.freedesktop.Notifications.xml#L42
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member="Get{,All}"
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=PropertiesChanged
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/ayatana/NotificationItem/*
    interface=org.kde.StatusNotifierItem
    member=XAyatanaNew*
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

# unity launcher
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/com/canonical/unity/launcherentry/[0-9]*
    interface=com.canonical.Unity.LauncherEntry
    member=Update
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/com/canonical/unity/launcherentry/[0-9]*
    interface=com.canonical.dbusmenu
    member="{LayoutUpdated,ItemsPropertiesUpdated}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/com/canonical/unity/launcherentry/[0-9]*
    interface="{com.canonical.dbusmenu,org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties}"
    member=Get*
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Snaps are unable to use the data in mimeinfo.cache (since they can't execute
# the returned desktop file themselves). unity messaging menu doesn't require
# mimeinfo.cache and xdg-mime will fallback to reading the desktop files
# directly to look for MimeType. Since reading the snap's own desktop files is
# allowed, we can safely deny access to this file (and xdg-mime will either
# return one of the snap's mimetypes, or none).
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/mimeinfo.cache r,

# then allow talking to Unity DBus service
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    path=/com/canonical/indicator/messages/service
    member=GetAll
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/com/canonical/indicator/messages/service
    interface=com.canonical.indicator.messages.service
    member={Register,Unregister}Application
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# When @{SNAP_NAME} == @{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}, this rule
# allows the snap to access parallel installs of this snap.
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    path=/com/canonical/indicator/messages/firefox_*_desktop
    member=GetAll
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# When @{SNAP_NAME} == @{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}, this rule
# allows the snap to access parallel installs of this snap.
dbus (receive, send)
    bus=session
    interface=com.canonical.indicator.messages.application
    path=/com/canonical/indicator/messages/firefox_*_desktop
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# This rule is meant to be covered by abstractions/dbus-session-strict but
# the unity launcher code has a typo that uses /org/freedesktop/dbus as the
# path instead of /org/freedesktop/DBus, so we need to all it here.
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/dbus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member=NameHasOwner
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

# appmenu
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member=ListNames
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/com/canonical/AppMenu/Registrar
    interface=com.canonical.AppMenu.Registrar
    member="{RegisterWindow,UnregisterWindow}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/com/canonical/AppMenu/Registrar
    interface=com.canonical.dbusmenu
    member=UnregisterWindow
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/com/canonical/menu/[0-9]*
    interface="{org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties,com.canonical.dbusmenu}"
    member="{GetAll,GetLayout}"
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

# Allow requesting interest in receiving media key events. This tells Gnome
# settings that our application should be notified when key events we are
# interested in are pressed, and allows us to receive those events.
dbus (receive, send)
  bus=session
  interface=org.gnome.SettingsDaemon.MediaKeys
  path=/org/gnome/SettingsDaemon/MediaKeys
  peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
  bus=session
  interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
  path=/org/gnome/SettingsDaemon/MediaKeys
  member="Get{,All}"
  peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow checking status, activating and locking the screensaver
# mate
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path="/{,org/mate/}ScreenSaver"
    interface=org.mate.ScreenSaver
    member="{GetActive,GetActiveTime,Lock,SetActive}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path="/{,org/mate/}ScreenSaver"
    interface=org.mate.ScreenSaver
    member=ActiveChanged
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Unity
dbus (send)
  bus=session
  interface=com.canonical.Unity.Session
  path=/com/canonical/Unity/Session
  member="{ActivateScreenSaver,IsLocked,Lock}"
  peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow unconfined to introspect us
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# gtk2/gvfs gtk_show_uri()
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/gtk/vfs/mounttracker
    interface=org.gtk.vfs.MountTracker
    member=ListMountableInfo,
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/gtk/vfs/mounttracker
    interface=org.gtk.vfs.MountTracker
    member=LookupMount,

# Description: Can access basic graphical desktop resources. To be used with
# other interfaces (eg, wayland).

#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
#include <abstractions/dbus-session-strict>

#include <abstractions/fonts>
owner @{HOME}/.local/share/fonts/{,**} r,
/var/cache/fontconfig/   r,
/var/cache/fontconfig/** mr,
# some applications are known to mmap fonts
/usr/{,local/}share/fonts/** m,

# Allow access to xdg-document-portal file system.  Access control is
# handled by bind mounting a snap-specific sub-tree to this location
# (ie, this is /run/user/<uid>/doc/by-app/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}
# on the host).
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/doc/{,*/} r,
# Allow rw access without owner match to the documents themselves since
# the user guided the access and can specify anything DAC allows.
/run/user/[0-9]*/doc/*/** rw,

# Allow access to xdg-desktop-portal and xdg-document-portal
dbus (receive, send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.portal.*
    path=/org/freedesktop/portal/{desktop,documents}{,/**}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive, send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    path=/org/freedesktop/portal/{desktop,documents}{,/**}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive, send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    path=/org/freedesktop/portal/{desktop,documents}{,/**}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# The portals service is normally running and newer versions of
# xdg-desktop-portal include AssumedAppArmor=unconfined. Since older
# systems don't have this and because gtkfilechoosernativeportal.c relies on
# service activation, allow sends to peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.{Desktop,Documents})
# for service activation.
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.portal.*
    path=/org/freedesktop/portal/desktop{,/**}
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Desktop),
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    path=/org/freedesktop/portal/desktop{,/**}
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Desktop),
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.portal.*
    path=/org/freedesktop/portal/documents{,/**}
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Documents),
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    path=/org/freedesktop/portal/documents{,/**}
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Documents),

# Allow to get the current idle time only from Mutter
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path="/org/gnome/Mutter/IdleMonitor/Core"
    interface="org.gnome.Mutter.IdleMonitor"
    member="GetIdletime"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow for color managed applications to communicate with colord
dbus (receive, send)
  bus=system
  interface=org.freedesktop.ColorManager
  path=/org/freedesktop/ColorManager
  member=FindDeviceByProperty
  peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
  bus=system
  interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
  path=/org/freedesktop/ColorManager
  member="Get{,All}"
  peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
  bus=system
  interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
  path="/org/freedesktop/ColorManager/{devices,profiles}/*"
  member="Get{,All}"
  peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow access to the ICC profiles in the home directory to
# be referred to from colord
owner @{HOME}/.local/share/icc r,

# Allow to send updates to the desktop session about ongoing jobs
# (for progress display in the task list)
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=com.canonical.Unity.LauncherEntry
    member=Update
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow to send updates to the desktop session about ongoing jobs
# (for KDE Plasma specific details)
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.kde.JobViewServer{,V2}
    path=/JobViewServer
    member=requestView
    peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.kde.JobView{,V2,V3}
    path=/org/kde/notificationmanager/jobs/*
    member={update,terminate}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow to display Status Notifier Items in the KDE Plasma systray
# (including supporting context menu)
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.kde.StatusNotifierWatcher
    path=/StatusNotifierWatcher
    member=RegisterStatusNotifierItem
    peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    path=/StatusNotifierWatcher
    member=Get
    peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=org.kde.StatusNotifierItem
    path=/StatusNotifierItem
    member={ProvideXdgActivationToken,Activate}
    peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    path=/StatusNotifierItem
    member=GetAll
    peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=com.canonical.dbusmenu
    path=/MenuBar
    member={AboutToShow,GetLayout,Event}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Description: Can access common desktop legacy methods. This gives privileged
# access to the user's input.

# accessibility (a11y)
#include <abstractions/dbus-session-strict>
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/a11y/bus
    interface=org.a11y.Bus
    member=GetAddress
    peer=(label=unconfined),

#include <abstractions/dbus-accessibility-strict>

# Allow access to the non-abstract D-Bus socket used by at-spi > 2.42.0
#   https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/at-spi2-core/-/issues/43
owner /{,var/}run/user/[0-9]*/at-spi/bus* rw,

# Allow access to the socket used by speech-dispatcher
owner /{,var/}run/user/[0-9]*/speech-dispatcher/speechd.sock rw,

# Allow the accessibility services in the user session to send us any events
dbus (receive)
    bus=accessibility
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow querying for capabilities and registering
dbus (send)
    bus=accessibility
    path="/org/a11y/atspi/accessible/root"
    interface="org.a11y.atspi.Socket"
    member="Embed"
    peer=(name=org.a11y.atspi.Registry, label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=accessibility
    path="/org/a11y/atspi/registry"
    interface="org.a11y.atspi.Registry"
    member="GetRegisteredEvents"
    peer=(name=org.a11y.atspi.Registry, label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=accessibility
    path="/org/a11y/atspi/registry/deviceeventcontroller"
    interface="org.a11y.atspi.DeviceEventController"
    member="Get{DeviceEvent,Keystroke}Listeners"
    peer=(name=org.a11y.atspi.Registry, label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=accessibility
    path="/org/a11y/atspi/registry/deviceeventcontroller"
    interface="org.a11y.atspi.DeviceEventController"
    member="NotifyListenersSync"
    peer=(name=org.a11y.atspi.Registry, label=unconfined),

# org.a11y.atspi is not designed for application isolation and these rules
# can be used to send change events for other processes.
dbus (send)
    bus=accessibility
    path="/org/a11y/atspi/accessible/root"
    interface="org.a11y.atspi.Event.Object"
    member="ChildrenChanged"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=accessibility
    path="/org/a11y/atspi/accessible/root"
    interface="org.a11y.atspi.Accessible"
    member="Get*"
    peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=accessibility
    path="/org/a11y/atspi/accessible/[0-9]*"
    interface="org.a11y.atspi.Event.Object"
    member="{ChildrenChanged,PropertyChange,StateChanged,TextCaretMoved}"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=accessibility
    path="/org/a11y/atspi/accessible/[0-9]*"
    interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties"
    member="Get{,All}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=accessibility
    path="/org/a11y/atspi/cache"
    interface="org.a11y.atspi.Cache"
    member="{Add,Remove}Accessible"
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label=unconfined),

# ibus
# subset of ibus abstraction
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gtk-2.0/[0-9]*/immodules/im-ibus.so mr,
owner @{HOME}/.config/ibus/      r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/ibus/bus/  r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/ibus/bus/* r,

# allow communicating with ibus-daemon (this allows sniffing key events)
unix (connect, receive, send)
    type=stream
    peer=(addr="@/tmp/ibus/dbus-*"),

# when running with glib >= 2.75.0, ibus uses a regular socket
owner @{HOME}/.cache/ibus/dbus-* rw,

# mozc
# allow communicating with mozc server
unix (connect, receive, send)
     type=stream
     peer=(addr="@tmp/.mozc.*"),

# gcin
# allow communicating with gcin server
unix (connect, receive, send)
     type=stream
     peer=(addr="@tmp/gcin-*/socket*"),

# fcitx
# allow communicating with fcitx dbus service
dbus send
    bus=fcitx
    path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member={Hello,AddMatch,RemoveMatch,GetNameOwner,NameHasOwner,StartServiceByName}
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus),

owner @{HOME}/.config/fcitx/dbus/* r,

# allow creating an input context
dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputmethod
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputMethod
    member=CreateIC*
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputcontext_[0-9]*
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext
    member=Reset
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# allow service to send us signals
dbus receive
    bus=fcitx
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus receive
    bus=session
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.*
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# use the input context
dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputcontext_[0-9]*
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext
    member="Focus{In,Out}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus send
    bus={fcitx,session}
    path=/inputcontext_[0-9]*
    interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext
    member="{CommitPreedit,Set*}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# glib-networking's GLib proxy (different than the portal's proxy service
# org.freedesktop.portal.ProxyResolver). The Lookup API allows specifying
# various URLs (eg, file://, http:// and https://) which will be given to the
# unconfined glib-pacrunner.
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/gtk/GLib/PACRunner
    interface=org.gtk.GLib.PACRunner
    member=Lookup
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/com/canonical/dbusmenu
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get*
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

dbus (bind)
    bus=session
    name=org.kde.StatusNotifierItem-[0-9]*,

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/StatusNotifierWatcher
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get
    peer=(name=org.kde.StatusNotifierWatcher, label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=PropertiesChanged
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/ayatana/NotificationItem/*
    interface=org.kde.StatusNotifierItem
    member=XAyatanaNew*
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus, label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

# Description: Can access global gsettings of the user's session. Restricted
# because this gives privileged access to sensitive information stored in
# gsettings and allows adjusting settings of other applications. Future GLib
# will not require plugging the interface and will instead probe if running
# under confinement and use a private data store in $SNAP_USER_DATA).

#include <abstractions/dbus-session-strict>

#include <abstractions/dconf>
owner /{,var/}run/user/*/dconf/user w,
owner @{HOME}/.config/dconf/user w,
dbus (receive, send)
    bus=session
    interface="ca.desrt.dconf.Writer"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Description: Can access non-hidden files in user's $HOME. This is restricted
# because it gives file access to all of the user's $HOME.

# Note, @{HOME} is the user's $HOME, not the snap's $HOME

# Allow read access to toplevel $HOME for the user
owner @{HOME}/ r,

# Allow read/write access to all files in @{HOME}, except snap application
# data in @{HOME}/snap and toplevel hidden directories in @{HOME}.
# TODO: use GenerateAAREExclusionPatterns for this - though the first
# rule here complicates using it slightly from the inclusion of the "." to 
# prevent reading dotfiles
owner @{HOME}/[^s.]**             rwklix,
owner @{HOME}/s[^n]**             rwklix,
owner @{HOME}/sn[^a]**            rwklix,
owner @{HOME}/sna[^p]**           rwklix,
owner @{HOME}/snap[^/]**          rwklix,

# Allow creating a few files not caught above
owner @{HOME}/{s,sn,sna}{,/} rwklix,

# Allow access to @{HOME}/snap/ to allow directory traversals from
# @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME} through @{HOME}/snap to @{HOME}.
# While this leaks snap names, it fixes usability issues for snaps
# that require this transitional interface.
owner @{HOME}/snap/ r,

# Allow access to gvfs mounts for files owned by the user (including hidden
# files; only allow writes to files, not the mount point).
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/gvfs/{,**} r,
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/gvfs/*/**  w,

# Disallow writes to the well-known directory included in
# the user's PATH on several distributions
audit deny @{HOME}/bin/{,**} wl,
audit deny @{HOME}/bin wl,

# Description: Can access opengl.

# specific gl libs
/var/lib/snapd/lib/gl{,32}/ r,
/var/lib/snapd/lib/gl{,32}/** rm,

# libdrm data files
/usr/share/libdrm/amdgpu.ids r,

# The nvidia container toolkit needs to traverse the top level libs directory
# in order to discover the libraries and generate a CDI config
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/} r,
# Bi-arch distribution nvidia support
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libcuda*.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libnvidia*.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libnvoptix*.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}tls/libnvidia*.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libnvcuvid.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}lib{GL,GLESv1_CM,GLESv2,EGL}*nvidia.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libGLdispatch.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}vdpau/libvdpau_nvidia.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libnv{rm,dc,imp,os}*.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}gbm/nvidia-drm_gbm.so{,.*} rm,

# CUDA libs
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libnpp{c,ig,ial,icc,idei,ist,if,im,itc}*.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libcublas{,Lt}*.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libcufft.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libcusolver.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libcuparse.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libcurand.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libcudnn{,_adv_infer,_adv_train,_cnn_infer,_cnn_train,_ops_infer,_ops_train}*.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libnvrtc{,-builtins}*.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}libnvToolsExt.so{,.*} rm,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}nvidia/wine/*.dll rm,

# Support reading the Vulkan ICD files
/var/lib/snapd/lib/vulkan/ r,
/var/lib/snapd/lib/vulkan/** r,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/usr/share/vulkan/icd.d/*nvidia*.json r,

# Support reading the GLVND EGL vendor files
/var/lib/snapd/lib/glvnd/ r,
/var/lib/snapd/lib/glvnd/** r,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/usr/share/glvnd/egl_vendor.d/ r,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/usr/share/glvnd/egl_vendor.d/*nvidia*.json r,

# Support Nvidia EGL external platform
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/usr/share/egl/egl_external_platform.d/ r,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/usr/share/egl/egl_external_platform.d/*nvidia*.json r,

# Main bi-arch GL libraries
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{,usr/}lib{,32,64,x32}/{,@{multiarch}/}{,nvidia*/}lib{OpenGL,GL,GLU,GLESv1_CM,GLESv2,EGL,GLX}.so{,.*} rm,

# Allow access to all cards since a) this is common on hybrid systems, b) ARM
# devices commonly have two devices (such as on the Raspberry Pi 4, one for KMS
# and another that does not) and c) there is nothing saying that /dev/dri/card0
# is the default card or the application is currently using.
/dev/dri/ r,
/dev/dri/card[0-9]* rw,

# nvidia
/etc/vdpau_wrapper.cfg r,
@{PROC}/driver/nvidia/params r,
@{PROC}/driver/nvidia/gpus/*/information r,
@{PROC}/driver/nvidia/capabilities/mig/monitor r,
@{PROC}/modules r,
/dev/nvidia* rw,
unix (send, receive) type=dgram peer=(addr="@nvidia[0-9a-f]*"),
# A socketpair with the NVIDIA DDX is needed for GLX.
# When Xorg is not confined, then a special-case object delegation allows this automatically.
# When Xorg is confined, object delegation is not implemented yet and we need a rule on our side to allow this.
unix (send, receive) type=stream peer=(label="Xorg"),
# driver profiles
/usr/share/nvidia/ r,
/usr/share/nvidia/** r,

# VideoCore/EGL (shared device with VideoCore camera)
/dev/vchiq rw,
# VideoCore Video decoding (required for accelerated MMAL video playback)
/dev/vcsm-cma rw,

# va-api
/dev/dri/renderD[0-9]* rw,

# intel
@{PROC}/sys/dev/i915/perf_stream_paranoid r,

# cuda
@{PROC}/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr r,
@{PROC}/devices r,
/sys/devices/system/memory/block_size_bytes r,
/sys/module/tegra_fuse/parameters/tegra_* r,
unix (bind,listen) type=seqpacket addr="@cuda-uvmfd-[0-9a-f]*",
/{dev,run}/shm/cuda.* rw,
/dev/nvhost-* rw,
/dev/nvmap rw,

# Tegra display driver
/dev/tegra_dc_ctrl rw,
/dev/tegra_dc_[0-9]* rw,

# Xilinx zocl DRM driver
# https://github.com/Xilinx/XRT/tree/master/src/runtime_src/core/edge/drm
/sys/devices/platform/amba{,_pl@[0-9]*}/amba{,_pl@[0-9]*}:zyxclmm_drm/* r,

# Imagination PowerVR driver
/dev/pvr_sync rw,

# ARM Mali driver
/dev/mali[0-9]* rw,
/dev/dma_buf_te rw,
/dev/dma_heap/linux,cma rw,
/dev/dma_heap/system rw,

# NXP i.MX driver
# https://github.com/Freescale/kernel-module-imx-gpu-viv
/dev/galcore rw,

# OpenCL ICD files
/etc/OpenCL/vendors/ r,
/etc/OpenCL/vendors/** r,

# Parallels guest tools 3D acceleration (video toolgate)
@{PROC}/driver/prl_vtg rw,

# /sys/devices
/sys/devices/{,*pcie-controller/,platform/{soc,scb}/*.pcie/}pci[0-9a-f]*/**/config r,
/sys/devices/{,*pcie-controller/,platform/{soc,scb}/*.pcie/}pci[0-9a-f]*/**/revision r,
/sys/devices/{,*pcie-controller/,platform/{soc,scb}/*.pcie/}pci[0-9a-f]*/**/resource r,
/sys/devices/{,*pcie-controller/,platform/{soc,scb}/*.pcie/}pci[0-9a-f]*/**/irq r,
/sys/devices/{,*pcie-controller/,platform/{soc,scb}/*.pcie/}pci[0-9a-f]*/**/boot_vga r,
/sys/devices/{,*pcie-controller/,platform/{soc,scb}/*.pcie/}pci[0-9a-f]*/**/{,subsystem_}class r,
/sys/devices/{,*pcie-controller/,platform/{soc,scb}/*.pcie/}pci[0-9a-f]*/**/{,subsystem_}device r,
/sys/devices/{,*pcie-controller/,platform/{soc,scb}/*.pcie/}pci[0-9a-f]*/**/{,subsystem_}vendor r,
/sys/devices/**/drm{,_dp_aux_dev}/** r,

# FIXME: this is an information leak and snapd should instead query udev for
# the specific accesses associated with the above devices.
/sys/bus/pci/devices/ r,
/sys/bus/platform/devices/soc:gpu/ r,
/run/udev/data/+drm:card* r,
/run/udev/data/+pci:[0-9a-f]* r,
/run/udev/data/+platform:soc:gpu* r,

# FIXME: for each device in /dev that this policy references, lookup the
# device type, major and minor and create rules of this form:
# /run/udev/data/<type><major>:<minor> r,
# For now, allow 'c'haracter devices and 'b'lock devices based on
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/devices.txt
/run/udev/data/c226:[0-9]* r,  # 226 drm

# From https://bugs.launchpad.net/snapd/+bug/1862832
/run/nvidia-xdriver-* rw,
unix (send, receive) type=dgram peer=(addr="@var/run/nvidia-xdriver-*"),

/dev/nvgpu/igpu[0-9]*/power rw,
/dev/nvgpu/igpu[0-9]*/ctrl rw,
/dev/nvgpu/igpu[0-9]*/prof rw,
/dev/host1x-fence rw,

# Kernel Fusion Driver for AMD GPUs
/dev/kfd rw,
/sys/module/amdgpu/initstate r,
/sys/devices/virtual/kfd/kfd/dev r,
/sys/devices/virtual/kfd/kfd/uevent r,
/sys/devices/virtual/kfd/kfd/topology/{,generation_id,system_properties} r,
/sys/devices/virtual/kfd/kfd/topology/nodes/[0-9]*/{,gpu_id,properties,io_links/[0-9]*/properties,caches/[0-9]*/properties,mem_banks/[0-9]*/properties} r,

# Description: Can access removable storage filesystems

# Allow read-access to /run/ for navigating to removable media.
/run/ r,

# Allow read on /run/media/ for navigating to the mount points. While this
# allows enumerating users, this is already allowed via /etc/passwd and getent.
/{,run/}media/ r,

# Mount points could be in /run/media/<user>/* or /media/<user>/*
/{,run/}media/*/ r,
/{,run/}media/*/** mrwklix,

# Allow read-only access to /mnt to enumerate items.
/mnt/ r,
# Allow write access to anything under /mnt
/mnt/** mrwklix,

# Description: Can access specific personal files or directories in the 
# users's home directory.
# This is restricted because it gives file access to arbitrary locations.
owner "@{HOME}/.mozilla/firefox{,/,/**}" rk,

# Description: Can access specific system files or directories.
# This is restricted because it gives file access to arbitrary locations.
"/etc/firefox{,/,/**}" rk,

# Description: Can access specific system files or directories.
# This is restricted because it gives file access to arbitrary locations.
"/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/usr/share/hunspell{,/,/**}" rk,

# Description: Can access the X server. Restricted because X does not prevent
# eavesdropping or apps interfering with one another.

# The X abstraction doesn't check the peer label, but in this case that's
# ok because x11ConnectedSlotAppArmor will limit which clients can connect
# to the slot implementation.
#include <abstractions/X>
#include <abstractions/fonts>
owner @{HOME}/.local/share/fonts/{,**} r,
/var/cache/fontconfig/   r,
/var/cache/fontconfig/** mr,

# Allow access to the user specific copy of the xauth file specified
# in the XAUTHORITY environment variable, that "snap run" creates on
# startup.
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/.Xauthority r,

# Allow reading an Xwayland Xauth file
# (see https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/mutter/merge_requests/626)
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/.mutter-Xwaylandauth.* r,
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/mutter/Xauthority r,

# Allow reading KDE Plasma's Xwayland Xauth file
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/xauth_* r,

# Deny access to ICE granted by abstractions/X
# See: https://bugs.launchpad.net/snapd/+bug/1901489
deny owner @{HOME}/.ICEauthority r,
deny owner /run/user/*/ICEauthority r,
deny unix (connect, receive, send)
    type=stream
    peer=(addr="@/tmp/.ICE-unix/[0-9]*"),

# Description: Can access the network as a client.
#include <abstractions/nameservice>
/run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf rk,
/etc/mdns.allow r,     # not yet included in the mdns abstraction
network netlink dgram, # not yet included in the nameservice abstraction

# systemd-resolved (not yet included in nameservice abstraction)
#
# Allow access to the safe members of the systemd-resolved D-Bus API:
#
#   https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/resolved/
#
# This API may be used directly over the D-Bus system bus or it may be used
# indirectly via the nss-resolve plugin:
#
#   https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/nss-resolve.html
#
#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
dbus send
     bus=system
     path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1"
     interface="org.freedesktop.resolve1.Manager"
     member="Resolve{Address,Hostname,Record,Service}"
     peer=(name="org.freedesktop.resolve1"),

# libnss-systemd (D-Bus portion from nameservice abstraction)
# Also allow lookups for systemd-exec's DynamicUsers via D-Bus
#   https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.exec.html
dbus send
     bus=system
     path="/org/freedesktop/systemd1"
     interface="org.freedesktop.systemd1.Manager"
     member="{GetDynamicUsers,LookupDynamicUserByName,LookupDynamicUserByUID}"
     peer=(name="org.freedesktop.systemd1"),

#include <abstractions/ssl_certs>

@{PROC}/sys/net/core/somaxconn r,
@{PROC}/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen r,

# Allow using netcat as client
/{,usr/}bin/nc{,.openbsd} ixr,

# Description: Can access various APIs needed by modern browsers (eg, Google
# Chrome/Chromium and Mozilla) and file paths they expect. This interface is
# transitional and is only in place while upstream's work to change their paths
# and snappy is updated to properly mediate the APIs.

# This allows raising the OOM score of other processes owned by the user.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/oom_score_adj rw,

# Chrome/Chromium should be fixed to honor TMPDIR or the snap packaging
# adjusted to use LD_PRELOAD technique from LP: #1577514
/var/tmp/ r,
owner /var/tmp/etilqs_* rw,

# Chrome/Chromium should be modified to use snap.$SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME.* or
# the snap packaging adjusted to use LD_PRELOAD technique from LP: #1577514
owner /{dev,run}/shm/{,.}org.chromium.* mrw,
owner /{dev,run}/shm/{,.}com.google.Chrome.* mrw,
owner /{dev,run}/shm/{,.}com.microsoft.Edge.* mrw,
owner /{dev,run}/shm/.io.nwjs.* mrw,

# Chrome's Singleton API sometimes causes an ouid/fsuid mismatch denial, so
# for now, allow non-owner read on the singleton socket (LP: #1731012). See
# https://forum.snapcraft.io/t/electron-snap-killed-when-using-app-makesingleinstance-api/2667/20
# parallel-installs: $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR is not remapped, need to use SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME
/run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/{,.}org.chromium.*/SS r,
/run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/{,.}com.google.Chrome.*/SS r,
/run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/{,.}com.microsoft.Edge.*/SS r,

# Allow access to Jupyter notebooks. 
# This is temporary and will be reverted once LP: #1959417 is fixed upstream.
owner @{HOME}/.local/share/jupyter/** rw,

# Allow reading platform files
/run/udev/data/+platform:* r,

# miscellaneous accesses
@{PROC}/vmstat r,

# Chromium content api sometimes queries about huge pages. Allow status of
# hugepages and transparent_hugepage, but not the pages themselves.
/sys/kernel/mm/{hugepages,transparent_hugepage}/{,**} r,

# Chromium content api in gnome-shell reads this
/etc/opt/chrome/{,**} r,
/etc/chromium/{,**} r,

# Chrome/Chromium should be adjusted to not use gconf. It is only used with
# legacy systems that don't have snapd
deny dbus (send)
    bus=session
    interface="org.gnome.GConf.Server",

# webbrowser-app/webapp-container tries to read this file to determine if it is
# confined or not, so explicitly deny to avoid noise in the logs.
deny @{PROC}/@{pid}/attr/{,apparmor/}current r,

# This is an information leak but disallowing it leads to developer confusion
# when using the chromium content api file chooser due to a (harmless) glib
# warning and the noisy AppArmor denial.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/mounts r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/mountinfo r,

# Since snapd still uses SECCOMP_RET_KILL, we have added a workaround rule to
# allow mknod on character devices since chromium unconditionally performs
# a mknod() to create the /dev/nvidiactl device, regardless of if it exists or
# not or if the process has CAP_MKNOD or not. Since we don't want to actually
# grant the ability to create character devices, explicitly deny the
# capability. When snapd uses SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, we can remove this rule.
# https://forum.snapcraft.io/t/call-for-testing-chromium-62-0-3202-62/2569/46
deny capability mknod,

# Description: Can inhibit and uninhibit screen savers in desktop sessions.
#include <abstractions/dbus-session-strict>
#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>

# gnome-session
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/gnome/SessionManager
    interface=org.gnome.SessionManager
    member={Inhibit,Uninhibit}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# unity screen API
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable"
    path="/com/canonical/Unity/Screen"
    member="Introspect"
    peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    interface="com.canonical.Unity.Screen"
    path="/com/canonical/Unity/Screen"
    member={keepDisplayOn,removeDisplayOnRequest}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# freedesktop.org ScreenSaver
# compatibility rule
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/Screensaver
    interface=org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver
    member={Inhibit,UnInhibit,SimulateUserActivity}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# xfce4-power-manager -
# https://github.com/xfce-mirror/xfce4-power-manager/blob/0b3ad06ad4f51eae1aea3cdc26f434d8b5ce763e/src/org.freedesktop.PowerManagement.Inhibit.xml
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/PowerManagement/Inhibit
    interface=org.freedesktop.PowerManagement.Inhibit
    member={Inhibit,UnInhibit}
    peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/PowerManagement/Inhibit
    interface=org.freedesktop.PowerManagement.Inhibit
    member=HasInhibitChanged
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# API rule
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/{,org/freedesktop/,org/gnome/}ScreenSaver
    interface=org.{freedesktop,gnome}.ScreenSaver
    member={Inhibit,UnInhibit,SimulateUserActivity}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# gnome, kde and cinnamon screensaver
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/{,ScreenSaver}
    interface=org.{gnome.ScreenSaver,kde.screensaver,cinnamon.ScreenSaver}
    member=SimulateUserActivity
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Description: Can manage timezones directly separate from 'config ubuntu-core'.
# Can change timezone via timedated D-Bus interface,
# Can read all properties of /org/freedesktop/timedate1 D-Bus object, see:
# https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/timedated/

#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>

/usr/share/zoneinfo/      r,
/usr/share/zoneinfo/**    r,
/etc/{,writable/}timezone rw,
/etc/{,writable/}localtime rw,
/etc/{,writable/}localtime.tmp rw, # Required for the timedatectl wrapper (LP: #1650688)

# Introspection of org.freedesktop.timedate1
# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/timedate1
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect,

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/timedate1
    interface=org.freedesktop.timedate1
    member="SetTimezone"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/timedate1
    interface=org.freedesktop.timedate1
    member="ListTimezones"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Read all properties from timedate1
# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/timedate1
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get{,All},

# Receive timedate1 property changed events
dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/timedate1
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=PropertiesChanged
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# As the core snap ships the timedatectl utility we can also allow
# clients to use it now that they have access to the relevant
# D-Bus method for setting the timezone via timedatectl's set-timezone
# command.
/usr/bin/timedatectl{,.real} ixr,

# timedatectl needs to bind the client side of the socket
unix (bind) type=stream addr="@*/bus/timedatectl*/system",

# Silence this noisy denial. systemd utilities look at /proc/1/environ to see
# if running in a container, but they will fallback gracefully. No other
# interfaces allow this denial, so no problems with silencing it for now. Note
# that allowing this triggers a 'ptrace trace peer=unconfined' denial, which we
# want to avoid.
deny @{PROC}/1/environ r,

# Description: Can query UPower for power devices, history and statistics.

#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>

# Find all devices monitored by UPower
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/UPower
    interface=org.freedesktop.UPower
    member=EnumerateDevices
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Read all properties from UPower and devices
# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/UPower{,/Wakeups,/devices/**}
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get{,All},

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/UPower
    interface=org.freedesktop.UPower
    member=GetCriticalAction
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/UPower
    interface=org.freedesktop.UPower
    member=GetDisplayDevice
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/UPower/devices/**
    interface=org.freedesktop.UPower.Device
    member={GetHistory,Refresh}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Receive property changed events
dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/UPower{,/devices/**}
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=PropertiesChanged
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow clients to introspect the service
# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    path=/org/freedesktop/UPower
    member=Introspect,

# Description: Can query system mount and disk quota information. This is
# restricted because it gives privileged read access to mount arguments and
# should only be used with trusted apps.

/{,usr/}bin/df ixr,

# Needed by 'df'. This is an information leak
@{PROC}/mounts r,
# Needed by 'htop' to detect whether it's running under lxc/lxd/docker
@{PROC}/1/mounts r,

owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/mounts r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/mountinfo r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/mountstats r,

# some processes might read mount* from /proc/thread-self/ instead
# and those resolve to the following: (no mountstats here)
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/@{tid}/mounts r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/@{tid}/mountinfo r,

/sys/devices/*/block/{,**} r,

# Needed by 'htop' to calculate RAM usage more accurately (and informational purposes, if enabled)
@{PROC}/spl/kstat/zfs/arcstats r,

@{PROC}/swaps r,

# This is often out of date but some apps insist on using it
/etc/mtab r,
/etc/fstab r,

# some apps also insist on consulting utab
/run/mount/utab r,

# Description: This interface allows for getting hardware information
# from the system. This is reserved because it allows reading potentially
# sensitive information.

# used by lscpu and 'lspci -A intel-conf1/intel-conf2'
capability sys_rawio,

# see loaded kernel modules
@{PROC}/modules r,

# used by lspci
capability sys_admin,
/etc/modprobe.d/{,*} r,
/{,usr/}lib/modprobe.d/{,*} r,

# for reading the available input devices on the system
/proc/bus/input/devices r,

# files in /sys pertaining to hardware (eg, 'lspci -A linux-sysfs')
/sys/{block,bus,class,devices,firmware}/{,**} r,

# files in /proc/bus/pci (eg, 'lspci -A linux-proc')
@{PROC}/bus/pci/{,**} r,

# power information
/sys/power/{,**} r,
/run/udev/data/+power_supply:* r,

# interrupts
@{PROC}/interrupts r,

# libsensors
/etc/sensors3.conf r,
/etc/sensors.d/{,*} r,

# Needed for udevadm
/run/udev/data/** r,
network netlink raw,

# util-linux
/{,usr/}bin/lsblk ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/lscpu ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/lsmem ixr,

# lsusb
# Note: lsusb and its database have to be shipped in the snap if not on classic
/{,usr/}bin/lsusb ixr,
/var/lib/usbutils/usb.ids r,
/dev/ r,
/dev/bus/usb/{,**/} r,
/etc/udev/udev.conf r,

# lshw -quiet (note, lshw also tries to create /dev/fb-*, but fails gracefully)
@{PROC}/devices r,
@{PROC}/ide/{,**} r,
@{PROC}/scsi/{,**} r,
@{PROC}/device-tree/{,**} r,
/sys/kernel/debug/usb/devices r,
@{PROC}/sys/abi/{,*} r,

# hwinfo --short
@{PROC}/ioports r,
@{PROC}/dma r,
@{PROC}/tty/driver/{,*} r,
@{PROC}/sys/dev/cdrom/info r,

# status of ksm (Kernel Samepage Merging), hugepages and transparent_hugepage, but not the pages themselves
/sys/kernel/mm/{ksm,hugepages,transparent_hugepage}/{,**} r,

# systemd-detect-virt
/{,usr/}bin/systemd-detect-virt ixr,
# VMs
@{PROC}/cpuinfo r,
@{PROC}/sysinfo r,  # Linux on z/VM
@{PROC}/xen/capabilities r,
/sys/hypervisor/properties/features r,
/sys/hypervisor/type r,

# containers
/run/systemd/container r,

# /proc/1/sched in a systemd-nspawn container with '-a' is supposed to show on
# its first line a pid that != 1 and systemd-detect-virt tries to detect this.
# This doesn't seem to be the case on (at least) systemd 240 on Ubuntu. This
# file is somewhat sensitive for arbitrary pids, but is not overly so for pid
# 1. For containers, systemd won't normally look at this file since it has
# access to /run/systemd/container and 'container' from the environment, and
# systemd fails gracefully when it doesn't have access to /proc/1/sched. For
# VMs, systemd requires access to /proc/1/sched in its detection algorithm.
# See src/basic/virt.c from systemd sources for details.
@{PROC}/1/sched r,

# systemd-detect-virt --private-users will look at these and the access is
# better added to system-observe. Since snaps typically only care about
# --container and --vm leave these commented out.
#@{PROC}/@{pid}/uid_map r,
#@{PROC}/@{pid}/gid_map r,
#@{PROC}/@{pid}/setgroups r,

# systemd-detect-virt --chroot requires 'ptrace (read)' on unconfined to
# determine if it is running in a chroot. Like above, this is best granted via
# system-observe.
#ptrace (read) peer=unconfined,

# Description: allows domain, record, service, and service type browsing
# as well as address, host and service resolving

/{,var/}run/avahi-daemon/socket rw,

#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Peer
    member=Ping
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi,label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# Allow accessing DBus properties and resolving
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.Server
    member={Get*,Resolve*,IsNSSSupportAvailable}
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi,label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# Allow receiving anything from the slot server
dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.Server
    peer=(label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# Don't allow introspection since it reveals too much (path is not service
# specific for unconfined)
# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
#dbus (send)
#    bus=system
#    path=/
#    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
#    member=Introspect,

# These allows tampering with other snap's browsers, so don't autoconnect for
# now.

# address resolving
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.Server
    member=AddressResolverNew
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/Client*/AddressResolver*
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.AddressResolver
    member=Free
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.AddressResolver
    peer=(label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# host name resolving
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.Server
    member=HostNameResolverNew
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/Client*/HostNameResolver*
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.HostNameResolver
    member=Free
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.HostNameResolver
    peer=(label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# service resolving
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.Server
    member=ServiceResolverNew
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/Client*/ServiceResolver*
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.ServiceResolver
    member=Free
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.ServiceResolver
    peer=(label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# domain browsing
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.Server
    member=DomainBrowserNew
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/Client*/DomainBrowser*
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.DomainBrowser
    member=Free
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.DomainBrowser
    peer=(label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# record browsing
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.Server
    member=RecordBrowserNew
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/Client*/RecordBrowser*
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.RecordBrowser
    member=Free
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.RecordBrowser
    peer=(label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# service browsing
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.Server
    member=ServiceBrowserNew
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/Client*/ServiceBrowser*
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.ServiceBrowser
    member=Free
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.ServiceBrowser
    peer=(label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# Service type browsing
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.Server
    member=ServiceTypeBrowserNew
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/Client*/ServiceTypeBrowser*
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.ServiceTypeBrowser
    member=Free
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Avahi, label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

dbus (receive)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.Avahi.ServiceTypeBrowser
    peer=(label="{unconfined,/usr/sbin/avahi-daemon,avahi-daemon}"),

# Description: can access documentation of system packages.

/usr/{,local/}share/doc/{,**} r,
/usr/share/cups/doc-root/{,**} r,
/usr/share/gimp/2.0/help/{,**} r,
/usr/share/gtk-doc/{,**} r,
/usr/share/javascript/** r,
/usr/share/libreoffice/help/{,**} r,
/usr/share/sphinx_rtd_theme/{,**} r,
/usr/share/xubuntu-docs/{,**} r,

# In addition to the bind mount, add any AppArmor rules so that
# snaps may directly access the slot implementation's files
# read-only.
"/snap/gnome-42-2204/226/**" mrkix,

# In addition to the bind mount, add any AppArmor rules so that
# snaps may directly access the slot implementation's files
# read-only.
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/default/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Adwaita/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/hicolor/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/HighContrast/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Humanity/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Humanity-Dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/ubuntu-mono-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/ubuntu-mono-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/DMZ-Black/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/DMZ-White/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-bark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-blue/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-magenta/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-olive/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-prussiangreen/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-purple/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-red/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-sage/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-viridian/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-bark-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-blue-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-magenta-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-olive-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-prussiangreen-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-purple-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-red-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-sage-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-viridian-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Ambiant-MATE/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Radiant-MATE/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-MATE-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-MATE-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-mate/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Yaru-mate-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Adapta-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Adapta-Nokto-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Dark-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Light-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Papirus-Maia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/breeze_cursors/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/Breeze_Snow/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary-xfce/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary-xfce-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary-xfce-darker/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/elementary-xfce-darkest/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/handhelds/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/redglass/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/icons/whiteglass/**" mrkix,

# In addition to the bind mount, add any AppArmor rules so that
# snaps may directly access the slot implementation's files
# read-only.
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/sounds/Yaru/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/sounds/freedesktop/**" mrkix,

# In addition to the bind mount, add any AppArmor rules so that
# snaps may directly access the slot implementation's files
# read-only.
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Adwaita/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Adwaita-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/HighContrast/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Ambiance/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Radiance/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Arc/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Arc-Dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Arc-Darker/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Breeze/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Breeze-Dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-bark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-blue/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-magenta/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-olive/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-prussiangreen/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-purple/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-red/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-sage/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-viridian/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-bark-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-blue-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-magenta-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-olive-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-prussiangreen-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-purple-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-red-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-sage-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-viridian-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/elementary/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Ambiant-MATE/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Ambiant-MATE-Dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Radiant-MATE/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-MATE-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-MATE-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-mate/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Yaru-mate-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-aliz/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-azul/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-dark-aliz/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-dark-azul/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-dark-sea/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Matcha-sea/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Greybird/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Greybird-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-compact/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-dark/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-dark-compact/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-light/**" mrkix,
"/snap/gtk-common-themes/1535/share/themes/Materia-light-compact/**" mrkix,

# TODO: should this be somewhere else?
/etc/mailcap r,

# While /usr/share/applications comes from the base runtime of the snap, it
# has some things that snaps actually need, so allow access to those and deny
# access to the others. This is duplicated from desktop for compatibility with
# existing snaps.
/usr/share/applications/ r,
/usr/share/applications/mimeapps.list r,
/usr/share/applications/xdg-open.desktop r,
# silence noisy denials from desktop files in core* snaps that aren't usable by
# snaps
deny /usr/share/applications/python*.desktop r,
deny /usr/share/applications/vim.desktop r,
deny /usr/share/applications/snap-handle-link.desktop r,  # core16

# Chromium content api unfortunately needs these for normal operation
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/fd/[0-9]* w,

# Various files in /run/udev/data needed by Chrome Settings. Leaks device
# information.
# input
/run/udev/data/c1:[0-9]* r,   # /dev/psaux
/run/udev/data/c10:[0-9]* r,  # /dev/adbmouse
/run/udev/data/c13:[0-9]* r,  # /dev/input/*
/run/udev/data/c180:[0-9]* r, # /dev/vrbuttons
/run/udev/data/c4:[0-9]* r,   # /dev/tty*, /dev/ttyS*
/run/udev/data/c5:[0-9]* r,   # /dev/tty, /dev/console, etc
/run/udev/data/c7:[0-9]* r,   # /dev/vcs*
/run/udev/data/+hid:* r,
/run/udev/data/+input:input[0-9]* r,

# screen
/run/udev/data/c29:[0-9]* r,  # /dev/fb*
/run/udev/data/+backlight:* r,
/run/udev/data/+leds:* r,

# sound
/run/udev/data/c116:[0-9]* r, # alsa
/run/udev/data/+sound:card[0-9]* r,

# miscellaneous
/run/udev/data/c108:[0-9]* r, # /dev/ppp
/run/udev/data/c189:[0-9]* r, # USB serial converters
/run/udev/data/c89:[0-9]* r,  # /dev/i2c-*
/run/udev/data/c81:[0-9]* r,  # video4linux (/dev/video*, etc)
/run/udev/data/c202:[0-9]* r, # /dev/cpu/*/msr
/run/udev/data/c203:[0-9]* r, # /dev/cuse
/run/udev/data/+acpi:* r,
/run/udev/data/+hwmon:hwmon[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/+i2c:* r,
/sys/devices/**/bConfigurationValue r,
/sys/devices/**/descriptors r,
/sys/devices/**/manufacturer r,
/sys/devices/**/product r,
/sys/devices/**/revision r,
/sys/devices/**/serial r,
/sys/devices/**/vendor r,
/sys/devices/system/node/node[0-9]*/meminfo r,

# Allow getting the manufacturer and model of the
# computer where Chrome/chromium is currently running.
# This is going to be used by the upcoming Hardware Platform
# extension API.
# https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/84618eee98fdf7548905e883e63e4f693800fcfa
/sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/product_name r,
/sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/sys_vendor r,

# Chromium content api tries to read these. It is an information disclosure
# since these contain the names of snaps. Chromium operates fine without the
# access so just block it.
deny /sys/devices/virtual/block/loop[0-9]*/loop/backing_file r,
deny /sys/devices/virtual/block/dm-[0-9]*/dm/name r,

# networking
/run/udev/data/n[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/+bluetooth:hci[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/+rfkill:rfkill[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/c241:[0-9]* r, # /dev/vhost-vsock

# storage
/run/udev/data/b1:[0-9]* r,   # /dev/ram*
/run/udev/data/b7:[0-9]* r,   # /dev/loop*
/run/udev/data/b8:[0-9]* r,   # /dev/sd*
/run/udev/data/b11:[0-9]* r,  # /dev/scd* and sr*
/run/udev/data/b230:[0-9]* r, # /dev/zvol*
/run/udev/data/c21:[0-9]* r,  # /dev/sg*
/run/udev/data/+usb:[0-9]* r,

# experimental
/run/udev/data/b252:[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/b253:[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/b259:[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/c24[0-9]:[0-9]* r,
/run/udev/data/c25[0-4]:[0-9]* r,

/sys/bus/**/devices/ r,

# Google Cloud Print
unix (bind)
     type=stream
     addr="@[0-9A-F]*._service_*",

# Policy needed only when using the chrome/chromium setuid sandbox
capability sys_ptrace,
ptrace (trace) peer=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.**,
unix (receive, send) peer=(label=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.**),

# If this were going to be allowed to all snaps, then for all the following
# rules we would want to wrap in a 'browser_sandbox' profile, but a limitation
# in AppArmor profile transitions prevents this.
#
# @{INSTALL_DIR}/@{SNAP_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/opt/google/chrome{,-beta,-unstable}/chrome-sandbox cx -> browser_sandbox,
# profile browser_sandbox {
#   ...
#   # This rule needs to work but generates a parser error
#   @{INSTALL_DIR}/@{SNAP_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/opt/google/chrome/chrome px -> snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.@{SNAP_APP},
#   @{INSTALL_DIR}/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/opt/google/chrome/chrome px -> snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.@{SNAP_APP},
#   ...
# }

# Required for dropping into PID namespace. Keep in mind that until the
# process drops this capability it can escape confinement, but once it
# drops CAP_SYS_ADMIN we are ok.
capability sys_admin,

# All of these are for sanely dropping from root and chrooting
capability chown,
capability fsetid,
capability setgid,
capability setuid,
capability sys_chroot,

# User namespace sandbox
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/setgroups rw,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/uid_map rw,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/gid_map rw,

# Webkit uses a particular SHM names # LP: 1578217
owner /{dev,run}/shm/WK2SharedMemory.* mrw,

# Chromium content api on (at least) later versions of Ubuntu just use this
owner /{dev,run}/shm/shmfd-* mrw,

# Clearing the PG_Referenced and ACCESSED/YOUNG bits provides a method to
# measure approximately how much memory a process is using via /proc/self/smaps
# (man 5 proc). This access allows the snap to clear references for pids from
# other snaps and the system, so it is limited to snaps that specify:
# allow-sandbox: true.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/clear_refs w,

# Allow setting realtime priorities. Clients require RLIMIT_RTTIME in the first
# place and client authorization is done via PolicyKit. Note that setrlimit()
# is allowed by default seccomp policy but requires 'capability sys_resource',
# which we deny be default.
# http://git.0pointer.net/rtkit.git/tree/README
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/RealtimeKit1
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.RealtimeKit1, label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/RealtimeKit1
    interface=org.freedesktop.RealtimeKit1
    member=MakeThread{HighPriority,Realtime,RealtimeWithPID}
    peer=(name=org.freedesktop.RealtimeKit1, label=unconfined),

# Until we have proper device assignment, allow access to all cameras
/dev/video[0-9]* rw,

# VideoCore cameras (shared device with VideoCore/EGL)
/dev/vchiq rw,

# Allow detection of cameras. Leaks plugged in USB device info
/sys/bus/usb/devices/ r,
/sys/devices/pci**/usb*/**/busnum r,
/sys/devices/pci**/usb*/**/devnum r,
/sys/devices/pci**/usb*/**/idVendor r,
/sys/devices/pci**/usb*/**/idProduct r,
/sys/devices/pci**/usb*/**/interface r,
/sys/devices/pci**/usb*/**/modalias r,
/sys/devices/pci**/usb*/**/speed r,
/run/udev/data/c81:[0-9]* r, # video4linux (/dev/video*, etc)
/run/udev/data/+usb:* r,
/sys/class/video4linux/ r,
/sys/devices/pci**/usb*/**/video4linux/** r,
/sys/devices/platform/**/usb*/**/video4linux/** r,

# allow unconfined clients to introspect us on classic
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# allow us to respond to unconfined clients via "org.mozilla.firefox{,.*}"
# on classic (send should be handled via another snappy interface).
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface="org.mozilla.firefox{,.*}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# allow us to respond to unconfined clients via "/org/mozilla/firefox{,/**}" (eg,
# org.freedesktop.*, org.gtk.Application, etc) on classic (send should be
# handled via another snappy interface).
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path="/org/mozilla/firefox{,/**}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# allow use of user namespaces
userns,

# subset of gnome abstraction
/etc/gtk-3.0/settings.ini r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/gtk-3.0/settings.ini r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/gtk-3.0/*.css r,
# Note: this leaks directory names that wouldn't otherwise be known to the snap
owner @{HOME}/.config/gtk-3.0/bookmarks r,

# kde theming support
owner @{HOME}/.config/kdeglobals r,

/usr/share/icons/                          r,
/usr/share/icons/**                        r,
/usr/share/icons/*/index.theme             rk,
/usr/share/pixmaps/                        r,
/usr/share/pixmaps/**                      r,
/usr/share/unity/icons/**                  r,
/usr/share/thumbnailer/icons/**            r,
/usr/share/themes/**                       r,

# The snapcraft desktop part may look for schema files in various locations, so
# allow reading system installed schemas.
/usr/share/glib*/schemas/{,*}              r,
/usr/share/gnome/glib*/schemas/{,*}        r,
/usr/share/ubuntu/glib*/schemas/{,*}       r,

# subset of freedesktop.org
owner @{HOME}/.local/share/mime/**   r,
owner @{HOME}/.config/user-dirs.* r,

/etc/xdg/user-dirs.conf r,
/etc/xdg/user-dirs.defaults r,

# gmenu
dbus (send)
     bus=session
     interface=org.gtk.Actions
     member=Changed
     peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/org/freedesktop/Notifications
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=PropertiesChanged
    peer=(label="{plasmashell,unconfined}"),

# DesktopAppInfo Launched
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/gtk/gio/DesktopAppInfo
    interface=org.gtk.gio.DesktopAppInfo
    member=Launched
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow accessing the GNOME crypto services prompt APIs as used by
# applications using libgcr (such as pinentry-gnome3) for secure pin
# entry to unlock GPG keys etc. See:
# https://developer.gnome.org/gcr/unstable/GcrPrompt.html
# https://developer.gnome.org/gcr/unstable/GcrSecretExchange.html
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/org/gnome/keyring/Prompter
    interface=org.gnome.keyring.internal.Prompter
    member="{BeginPrompting,PerformPrompt,StopPrompting}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# While the DBus path is not snap-specific, by the time an application
# registers the prompt path via DBus, Gcr will check that it isn't
# already in use and send the client an error if it is. See:
# https://github.com/snapcore/snapd/pull/7673#issuecomment-592229711
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path=/org/gnome/keyring/Prompt/p[0-9]*
    interface=org.gnome.keyring.internal.Prompter.Callback
    member="{PromptReady,PromptDone}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow use of snapd's internal 'xdg-open'
/usr/bin/xdg-open ixr,
# While /usr/share/applications comes from the base runtime of the snap, it
# has some things that snaps actually need, so allow access to those and deny
# access to the others
/usr/share/applications/ r,
/usr/share/applications/mimeapps.list r,
/usr/share/applications/xdg-open.desktop r,
# silence noisy denials from desktop files in core* snaps that aren't usable by
# snaps
deny /usr/share/applications/python*.desktop r,
deny /usr/share/applications/vim.desktop r,
deny /usr/share/applications/snap-handle-link.desktop r,  # core16

dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/
    interface=com.canonical.SafeLauncher
    member=OpenURL
    peer=(label=unconfined),
# ... and this allows access to the new xdg-open service which
# is now part of snapd itself.
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path=/io/snapcraft/Launcher
    interface=io.snapcraft.Launcher
    member={OpenURL,OpenFile}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow checking status, activating and locking the screensaver
# gnome/kde/freedesktop.org
dbus (send)
    bus=session
    path="/{,org/freedesktop/,org/gnome/}ScreenSaver"
    interface="org.{freedesktop,gnome}.ScreenSaver"
    member="{GetActive,GetActiveTime,Lock,SetActive}"
    peer=(label=unconfined),

dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    path="/{,org/freedesktop/,org/gnome/}ScreenSaver"
    interface="org.{freedesktop,gnome}.ScreenSaver"
    member=ActiveChanged
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow unconfined to introspect us
dbus (receive)
    bus=session
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# These accesses are noisy and applications can't do anything with the found
# icon files, so explicitly deny to silence the denials
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/icons/{,**/} r,

# These accesses occur when flatpaks are on the system since it updates
# XDG_DATA_DIRS to contain $HOME/.local/share/flatpak/exports/share. Until
# we have better XDG_DATA_DIRS handling, silence these noisy denials.
# https://github.com/snapcrafters/discord/issues/23#issuecomment-637607843
deny @{HOME}/.local/share/flatpak/exports/share/** r,

# Allow access to the IBus portal (IBUS_USE_PORTAL=1)
dbus (send)
      bus=session
      path=/org/freedesktop/IBus
      interface=org.freedesktop.IBus.Portal
      member=CreateInputContext
      peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.IBus),

dbus (send, receive)
      bus=session
      path=/org/freedesktop/IBus/InputContext_[0-9]*
      interface=org.freedesktop.IBus.InputContext
      peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow access to the Fcitx portal, supported by fcitx/fcitx5
dbus (send)
      bus=session
      path=/{,org/freedesktop/portal/}inputmethod
      interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputMethod1
      member={CreateInputContext,Version}
      peer=(name=org.freedesktop.portal.Fcitx),

dbus (send, receive)
      bus=session
      path=/{,org/freedesktop/portal/}inputcontext/**
      interface=org.fcitx.Fcitx.InputContext1
      peer=(label=unconfined),

# Layout path: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/opensc-pkcs11.so
"/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/opensc-pkcs11.so" mrwklix,
# Layout path: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/webkit2gtk-4.0
"/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/webkit2gtk-4.0{,/**}" mrwklix,
# Layout path: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/webkit2gtk-4.1
"/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/webkit2gtk-4.1{,/**}" mrwklix,
# Layout path: /usr/share/alsa
"/usr/share/alsa{,/**}" mrwklix,
# Layout path: /usr/share/libdrm
"/usr/share/libdrm{,/**}" mrwklix,
# Layout path: /usr/share/xml/iso-codes
"/usr/share/xml/iso-codes{,/**}" mrwklix,
# Support applications which use the unity messaging menu, xdg-mime, etc
# This leaks the names of snaps with desktop files
/var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/ r,
# Allowing reading only our desktop files (required by (at least) the unity
# messaging menu).
# parallel-installs: this leaks read access to desktop files owned by keyed
# instances of @{SNAP_NAME} to @{SNAP_NAME} snap
/var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_DESKTOP}_*.desktop r,
# Explicitly deny access to other snap's desktop files
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/[^f]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/f[^i]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/fi[^r]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/fir[^e]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/fire[^f]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firef[^o]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefo[^x]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox[^_]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_[^f]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_f[^i]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_fi[^r]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_fir[^e]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_fire[^f]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_firef[^o]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_firefo[^x]**.desktop r,

# Support applications which use the unity messaging menu, xdg-mime, etc
# This leaks the names of snaps with desktop files
/var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/ r,
# Allowing reading only our desktop files (required by (at least) the unity
# messaging menu).
# parallel-installs: this leaks read access to desktop files owned by keyed
# instances of @{SNAP_NAME} to @{SNAP_NAME} snap
/var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_DESKTOP}_*.desktop r,
# Explicitly deny access to other snap's desktop files
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/[^f]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/f[^i]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/fi[^r]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/fir[^e]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/fire[^f]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firef[^o]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefo[^x]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox[^_]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_[^f]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_f[^i]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_fi[^r]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_fir[^e]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_fire[^f]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_firef[^o]**.desktop r,
deny /var/lib/snapd/desktop/applications/firefox_firefo[^x]**.desktop r,

}

${this.title}

Code Editor : snap.firefox.firefox